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IN THE SUPREME COURT·
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
-------~------------------------------------

LORRAINE JANE WlLCKEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

CASE NO. 16,772

LEONARD THEODORE WILCKEN,
Defendant-Respondent.

-------------------------------------------BRIEF O;F APPELLANT

-------------------------------------------NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the plaintiff for Divorce with the
attendant issues of property settlement, debt -allocation and
alimony.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The plaintiff's complaint in this action was filed on
May 11, 1978, with the court entering its temporary order on
June 22, 1978.

(.R. 1-3, 10} .. The matter was heard by the

court on the merits for the

(R. 17-19).

f~rst

time on November 27, 1978.

The court concluded the trial on December 13, 1978.

(R. 17, 21-22).

,At the conclusion of the December 13, 1978,

hearing, the court granted eac.h of the parties a divorce
to become final upon entry.

tR.

18).

The court signed

the findings of fact and conclusions of law granting the divorce
on January 8, 1979.

(R. 26-27)

~

The court retained jurisdiction

over the property of the parties pending the order of the court
dividing the same.

(R. 18).

Counsel for both sides were ordered

to submit
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
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(R.18).

The court made its decision relating to the property of
parties by an Orde;r- dated .May 17, 1979.

(R. 31-34) .

th~

Th,-;

court signed the amended findings of fact, conclusions of law
and decree incorporating the property distribution on the 10th

CR. 69-80) •

day of July, 1979.

The plaintiff made its first motion to amend the Decree on
June 19, 1979,

(R. 97}.

(R. 67) which was heard on August 14, 1979.

The court partially_ granted the plaintiff's motion to

amend by its ruling dated September 13, 1979 (R. 24-26) and
signed the second amended findings of fact, conclusions of law
and decree on October 4, 1979.

(R. 131-144).

The plaintiff moved the court for a new trial on September
23, 1979, on the basis of newly discovered evidence, the
insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict and the
error of the court in applying the law.

(R. 128).

The court heard oral arguments on the plaintiff's motion
on November 9, 1979,

(R. 183} and the Court made its ruling

amending again its prior decree on November 13, 1979.

(R. 184,

186-87} ..
The plaintiff f ,iled her Notice of Appeal on November 20_,
19 7 9 .

(R • 19 4 } •

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant requests this Court to amend the judgment
to conform to the appellant's position on appeal, or, in the
alternative, remand the case for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF

~ACTS

-2provided
.....
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The appellant and respondent were married on November 22,

1972, in Salt Lake City, Utah.
as issue of the marriage.

There were no children born

(T. 1,26).

The appellant is in her

late fifties and the respondent in his early sixties.

(T .. 209).

The appellant had been single for eighteen years prior to her
marriage to the respondent.

(T. 214).

The appellant owned a

.home iri Wisconsin prior to coming to Utah and applied the monthly
rental receipts in the amount of $300.00 to the marriage endeavor.
(T. 213-4).

At the time of their marriage the respondent was

living with his brother in a trailer.

(T. 215).

The respondent

was employed by the Utah Department of Transportation where he
had a substantial ret.;lrement benefit.

(R. 39, 45).

During the

early part of ·the marriage, the appellant was· responsible for
paying for common_living expenses which she estimated to be

$8,500.00 the first year.

(T. 243, 277}.

The appellant spent

$6, 62-6 .13 over the mar;r;-iage term from her separate monies to

maintain the household.

lT. 282).

The parties acquired various pieces of.real property du~ing
the cou.rse of thei;i:;- inarr.;iage which are set out in the second
amended findings of fact and conclusions of law.

(R. 131-44).

The dispute on appeal is centered around the distribution of
real property, the failure of the trial court to debit the
respondent's pre-marital assets with his pre-marital debits, the
denial of appellant's motion for a new trial and the error of the
court in debit.;lng the plainti~f 's pre-marital assets in the
amount of $10,000.00.
POINT l

.... 3-
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THE COURT ERRED IN DISTRIBUTING THE REAL
PROPERTY OF TH.E PARTIES.

It is well established that a party seeking a reversal
of the trial court's distribution of property must .Prove a
misunderstanding or misapplication of the
law resulting in substantial and prejudi-·
cial error, or that such a serious inequity
resulted from the order as to constitute
an abuse of the trial court's discretion.
Mccrary v. McCrary, 599 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Utah, 1979); Mitchell
v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah, 1974).

Once that test is

met the Court may either exercise its own prerogative of
making a modification in the decree or remand for entry of a
modified decree by the trial court.

Read v. Read, 594 P.2d

871, 873 (Utah, 1979), Utah Const. Art. VIII, Sec. 9;
Humphreys v. Humphreys, 520 P.2d ·193 (Utah, 1974}; Hard.ing v.
Harding, 26 Utah 2d 277, 488 P.2d 308 (1971}.
The trial court has the obligation of making a fair and
equitable distribution of property so as to allow for the protection and welfare of the parties to a divorce proceeding.
Utah Code Annotated, §30-3-5 (19531; Pearson v. Pearson,

561

p·.2d 1080 (Utah, 1977); Sea;cle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah

19 7 4) .
The Court in this case divided the assets of the marriage
by first determining what property the parties had kept as
separate property and thus not corruningled with the assets of
the marriage.· The ap~ellant claims no error with respect to
the determination of separate property.

The Court accordingly

allowed each party to retain their own separate property which

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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is delineated in the findings of fact.

(R. 132-133, paragraphs

1, 3, · 4, Sa) .

The Court then valued the pre-marital assets of the parties
and gave each party a credit to be used as an off-set when
the property was sold or divided . . The Court gave each party the
right to retain their pre-marital property and deduct the fair
market value of the property from the total value of their
pre-marital assets.

lR. 132-34, paragraphs 2, 10; R. 185,

paragraph 2}.
The real property which the parties ow·n.ed at one time
or another is described as follows:

1) Independence Property,

composed of approximately 160 acres; 2}

White Rocks Property,

broken into two pieces comprising approximately 16 acres; 3)
Gusher Property, which was approximately 26 acres; 4) The
North Fork Property composed of approximately 10 acres; 5)
and th.e North Fork :Property composed of 11 acres with a cabin
situated thereon; and

61 the Bluebell Property comprised.of

approximately 114 acres.

(l? 1. Ex . 1) .

The Court ordered all the real property sold and the
proceeds divided evenly between the parties with the exception
of the Independence property which was given almost entirely.
to the respondent.

It is the plaintiff's

content~on

that

the distribution of the trial court in that regard was
inequitable and effectually ignored the $23,000.00 contribution
to the property of the parties by the appellant.
The Independe.nce property was acquired by the ;respondent
prior to marriage for the price of $14,250.00.

(Pl. Exhibit 1).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

At the time of the marriage, November 22, 1972, the respondent
had paid $10,000.00.

(Pl. Exhibit l}.

Then from the joint

funds of the marriage $1,178.75 was paid in 1973, $1,123.25 on
November 5, 1974, $1,178.75 on March 1, 1974 and the remaining
balance on rebruary 27, 1976.

(Pl. Exhibit 1)

The Independence Property was sold on March 7, 1976 for
the price of

$43~500.00.

·The buyers paid $12,615.00 down

with payments of $5,000.00 to be paid annually through 1983.
(Pl. Exhibit 11.

The Court allowed the defendant a credit on his pre-maritaJ
assets of $33,522.50 for the value of the Independence property
at the time of divorce and ruled that the portion of the sales
price of the Independence property attributed to

t~e

joint

efforts of the parties during the marriage was only $10,027.50,
which· sum would be divided between the parties, leaving the
appellant with $5,013.75 out of _the total profit which did not
include interest.

tR.

133, paragraph Sa).

There is no dispute that the sales contract to the Independence property ran to both parties jointly, yet the_.
appellant is to receive only a miniscule portion of the total
p;r-ofit.

The Court established the amount of the proceeds to

be given the respondent from the Independence property by
determining the percentage of the $14,250.00 purchase price,
that had been paid by the respondent before marriage.

There

are several gross inadequacies created by the apportionment
made by the Court.
First, even though the property appreciated in value duri~
-6-.
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the time the couple was married, the respondent's portion of
that increase was established by the relationship of the down
payment to the sales price irrespective of the amount of
appreciation during the course of the marriage.

Further, even

though the property's sale value was not reached until the
marriage was over, the respondent is allowed to take the
appreciated value, in its entirety, as a pre-marital asset.
For example, if a piece of property was purchased for $1,000-.00,
and $900.00 was paid, before marriage, by one of the parties,
it would be unfair to award that party ninety percent (90%) of
the proceeds of the sale when the appreciation, accruing
during marriage, belongs to both

parties~

Otherwise, the party

not credited with the initial purchase would essentially gain
nothing from the investment during the marriage term.
Most amazingly, even though the Independence property was
only worth approximately $14,250.00 at the time of the marriage,
the court has allowed t;.he respondent to take the value

o~

years

of appreciation, most of which occurred during the marriage
with the appellant, and retroactively apply the post-marital
appreciated amount as a pre-marital asset which can be credited
against any asset of the marriage.
It is submitted that if, after a couple was married, a
decision was made to sell the Independence property, and the
proceeds invested somewhere else, the parties would be entitled
to share equally in the return on the proceeds of the new
investment.

But, as structured by the Court, the increase in

the value of the Independence property, ran almost exclusively
-7-
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to the defendant.

lf the p;r:'operty outlined in the hypothetical

above appreciated from $1,000.00 to $15,000.00 in value during
the course of the marriage, it would be inequitable, tq say
the least, to allow the party purchasing the property for
$900.00, before marriage, to receive approximately ninety perce
(90%) of the proceeds when the real increase·in value was joint
property in that the apprec;iation accrued during marriage, in
which both parties should share equally.
Second, under the formula created by the Court, the
defendant not only retains, under the hypothetical set out.
above, ninety percent ·(90%} of the proceeds of the sale outright, he is entitled to one-half of the remaining percentage
because the court termed ·the remainder as joint property.
Reference to the hypothetical above sets out and clarifies
the inadequacies of the formula employed by the Court.

If the

property, used as an illustration above; was sold for $15,000.0
the party purchasing the property before marriage gets ninety
percent (90%) of the proceeds which is $13,500.00.

Then, out

of the remaining $1,500.00, termed joint property, the party
purchasipg the property before marriage shares equally and gets
an additional $750. 00, leaving the other party with only $750.0
Third, the Court credited the respondent's pre-marita1
assets with the amount of down payment that he made on the
Independence property,

CR. 132, paragraph 2) , which, under the

hypothetical, would exhaust all·' the funds.

Thus, the responder

in this case is allowed approximately eighty percent (80%} of
the proceeds of the sale of the Independence property outright
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Since the Court termed the remaining twenty percent (20%) of
the profit as joint property, the defendant is allowed one-half
of that amount, thus bringing the total to ninety percent
(90%}.

Then, the defendant is given credit for the

$10~000.00

down payment which he made prior to marriage, reducing the
appellant's share in the property to almost nothing.

By the

Court's computation, the respondent was allowed to isolate
for himself almost One hundred percent of a significant asset
belonging to both parties.
In stark contrast to the method used by.the·Court in
allocating the proceeds from the Independence property, the
Court allowed the parties to share equally in the proceeds
of all the other real property despite the fact that the
appellant had contributed over $23,000.00 of pre-marital
assets towards the purchase of that

property~

the parties were married on November 22, ·1972.
purchased the White
October 25, 1972.
(Pl. Exhibit 1).

~ocks

As stated above,
The parties

property, one month prior, on .

(T. 220}.

The purchase price was

$68,500~00.

The appellant paid $20,000.00 down which was

derived solely from the appellant's pre-marital assets.

(T. 221}.

It is undisputed that none of the assets belonging to
Mr. Wilcken, the respondent, were used in the down payment on
this property.

After the marriage, the parties contributed

an additional $5,000.00 which was paid in October, 1973.
{T. 221}.

The property was sold on April 10, 1974 for

$102,700.00, netting a profit to the parties in the amount of
$40,126.00.
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In its Finding$ of Fact #6, the Court found that the procee1
of the sale of the White :Rocks property:
went to the purchase of the Gusher and
Bluebell property, and although not all
the money was specifically accounted for
the Court feels that some of it probably
went into the woodshed business and that
some probably went to miscellaneous and
personal expenses 0£ the:parties.
Paragraph #7:
The Court further finds that some of the.
prof it from the sale of the Gusher property went to the purchase of the North
Fork property and that a portion of the
capital investment of the Gusher property
went into the Bluebell property, but that
in any event the profit and capital invested in the White Rocks and Gusher
properties has been reinvested by the
parties in properties they continue to
hold on the North Fork of the Duchesne
and in the Bluebell ranch. The Court
finds that these properties represent the
joint efforts of the parties during their
marriage and that the same should be sold
and the proceeds divided as above indicated.
{R. 133-34).

In respect to the other real

prope~ty

owned by

the parties, the Court found:
5)
During their mar.riage, the parties
have acquired certain real and personal
property, to-wit:
the Bluebell ran.ch;
the 10 acre tract on the Duchesne river;
the 11 acre tract on the Duchesne river;
a cabin on said acreage on the Duchesne
river; the woodshed; bank accounts; and
other miscellaneous property, all of which
should be equally divided between the parties
except as hereinafter adjusted and set
forth by the Court.
tn particular, the
Court finds:
a. the portion of the Independence
property attributed to the joint efforts
of the parties during the marriage is in
the sum of $10,027.50 and that sum should
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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be equally divided between the parties.

b.
the 10 a.ere tract and 11 acre
tract on the North Fork of the Duchesne
river, together with any improvements
thereon should be sold and the proceeds
divided equally between the plaintiff and
defendant.
(R. 133-34).
Under the Court's calculations, the appellant was credited
with $23,000.00 of pre-marital

·ass~ts,

representing the amounts

of money used by the plaintiff to purchase the White Rocks property.

The similarity between how the Court calculated the

distribution of the Independence property and the rest of the
property ends with that similarity.

There is no calculation,

on the part of the Court, to calculate the percentage of the
total purchase price represented by the appellant's down payment.
Thus, even though the plaintiff provided $23,000.00 of her
pre-marital assets for the purchase of property, which amount
is twice that invested by the defendant, the plaintiff receives
nothing more than a credit to her pre-marital assets in the
amount of $23,000.00 and recognizes no percentage of the appreciation of the various pieces of property.

There can be little

doubt that the method by which the Court used to distribute the
real properties of the parties, was grossly unjust and

in~quitable.

Accordingly, all of the real property of the parties should
either be sold and both be allowed to join equally in the proceeds,
or, the plaintiff should receive the same benefit on her $23,000.00
investment as the defendant recognized on his $10,000.00.
POINT II
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THE COUR,T ERRED IN NOT DEDUCTING E'ROM THE
RESPONDENT'S J?R.E-MARITAL ASSETS, THE
AMOUNT OF HIS J?R,E-MARITAL DEBTS.
The respondent's pre-marital assets are listed in paragrap
2 of the second amended findings of fact as follows:

PRE-MARITAL P;ROPER,TY OF THE DEFENDANT, LEONARD THEODORE
WI LC KEN
1958 International Tractor
1969 GMC l?ickup

$

Horse Tack
2-Horse Trailer
1 Hay Wagon
Savings Bonds
50 Head of Cattle plu? 45 head
Forest perrnit
2 bulls at $500.00 each
less cost of rai?ing stock
sub-total
The following property having an aggregate
value of $33,522.50, based upon the
percentage of the original purchase
price paid by defendant prior to
marriage and the percentage of the
purchase price paid by the parties
after marriage, in relationship to
the total sales price of the property.
TOTAL CONTRIBUTION

500.00
1,100.00
300.00
800.00
800.00
400.00

31,500.00
1,000.00
$36,400.00
..,.5, 500. 00
$30.,900.00

$33,522.50
$64,422.50

(R. 132) •

The respondent testified that he corrunented to friends duri1
1974, that the period of time the plaintiff was married was the

first time in his life he had ever been out of debt.

(T. 334).

The respondent testified that at the time he was married to the
appellant he had a debt at G .M.A. C. of $900. 00; $2, 500. 00 to thE
credit Union; $3,198.00 to Kamas State Bank and about $2,000.00
on the stock for a total of $8,598.00.

(T. 334-5}.

The Court

simply did not deduct from the respondent's pre-marital assets,
the substantial debt owing thereon which was clearly error.
-12-
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In addition, the a.ppellant furnished newly discovered evidence in post-trial motions that the respondent took out a loan
for $19,100.00 f,rom the Utah Farm Production Credit.

The docu-

ments indicate that the loan was taken out on November 14,
1972, eight days before the marriage in the name of the defendant

only.

(R. 155-6, 171-4).

It seems inconceivable that the

Court would allow the respondent a credit in the amount of
$31, 500. 00 for. his cattle yet not deduct the substantial farm ·

debt that was retired by the parties during the course of the
marriage.

l?OINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE PLAINTIFF'S.
MOTION roR A NEW TRIAL.
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure deals with the
granting of new trials.

1'he grounds upon which a new trial may

be granted are designated in subsection (a) of that rule.
~

One

of these grounds is newly discovered evidence, which is set out
as follows:
Ia] a new trial may be granted to all or
any of the parties in and on all or part
of the issues, for any of· the following
causes: . . . (4) newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the
application 1 which he could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at trial.

Plaintiff produced, in post-trial motions, evidence which
tested the defendant's credulity.
The respondent .testified that he received the sum of $31,500.00
for a grazing permit and cows owned by him prior to marriage.

(T. 296-8}.

Despite

~r.

Wilcken's testimony, the defendant's tax
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returns for the

yea,r~

1972 and 1973 indicate tha,t in fact, the

defendant owned 48 cows at the time of h,is ·:marriage to the .plain..
tiff and not the 50

COW$

indicated in his testimony.

The value

given to those 48 cows on his ,income tax, however, is only
$4,900.00.

Nowhere in the defendant's tax returns for the

years 1972 through 1976 is there

a~y

income listed from the

sale of cows acquired before marriage which supports the
defendant's figure of $3,500.00

Nowhere in the· defendant'·s

tax returns are there any figures which would support the·
defendant's claims th.at cows were sold for anything near the
$700.00 a head testified on direct examination.

The .defendant

admitted that his statements were not reflected on the income
tax.

(T. 330-33}.

The evidence proferred to the Court took

the form of sales receipts given by Zane Christensen to the
respondent upon the sale of the cows that the defendant brought
to the marriage and the bank records concerning the sale to Joe
Curry of° the ·forest grazing permit that was also brought to the
marriage.

Those receipts show that contrary to the defendant's

testimony that

th~

sale of the cows brought receipts of $31,500.

the actual value received for the cows and the forest permit was
only $9,200.00.

(R. 154, 155, 162-168; Pl. Ex. 2, 3, 4, and 5}.

The highest sale reflected in the defendant's tax returns is~
the year 197 4 which lists the sale of cows at approximately $400
a head.

The most the defendant could have possibly grossed on

the 48 cattle owned at the time of marriage was accordingly

$11,000.00 as

compa~ed

to the $31,500.00 testified to by the

defendant.

-14-
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I"n toto, the evidence produced both during the trial
and in plaintiff's motion for a new trial, based on new evidence,
illustrate that the two largest items of pre-martial assets,
the amount given for the Independence property and the amount
·credited for the cows, were highly disproportionate to the true
value.
POINT JV
THE COURT ERRED IN DEBITING THE APPELLANT'S
PRE-MARITAL ,ASSETS IN THE SUM OF $10, 000. 00.

The Court in paragraph 11 of the second amended findings of
fact, debited the plaintiff's account by reason of the $10,000.00
that the plaintiff allegedly gave her daughter by a previous
marriage from the joint funds of the parties.

(R. 135).

The Court assumed that the dispursement to the daughter was
a gift but the evidence.was contrary to that conclusion.
The Wood Shed is a business in Roosevelt which the parties
_owned jointly with the appellant's daughter and husband.

(T. 234).

The parties were in the business of refinishing furniture, and
selling various inventory items.

(T. 235). The. evidence

indicated ,that the business was worth approximately $20, 000. 00_.
~-

385, 314. 350}.
The appellant testified that the $9,000.00 payment was to

buy out her daughter and son-in-law's interest in the Wood Shed.
(T. 386).
314-15).

Even the defendant testified to that effect.

(T.

The Court was unjustified in concluding that the pay-

ment was a gift in that both parties agreed that the business
included the daughter and

~on-in-law

who were entitled to half

·the proceeds .
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It is the a.ppella.nt's contention that the debiting of

her pre-marital assets. by $10, 000. 00 be:::ause she a,llegedly gave
that amount to her daughter during the course of the marriage,
is wholly unsupported by the evidence.

The only evidence offer

on the subject was the testimony of the.plaintiff who said that
this amount, $9,000;00 instead of $10,000.00, was given to her
daughter not as a gift, but as consideration for her daughter's
and son-in-law's one-half interest in the Wood Shed business.
(T. 386).

The appellant testified further that the Wood Shed

business was not capitalized by the joint funds of the parties,
but was established by the institutional loan money which was
paid back out of the proceeds of the business.

(T. 363).

Plaintiff also testified that her daughter and son-in-law·
invested substantial time and effort in the Wood Shed business
for which they received no salary.

Thus, for the court to

hold that the appellant's account must be debited by $10,000.00
which was not a gift, is wholly unsupported by any evidence
adduced at trial.
CONCLUSION
It is the appellant's

contention that the large disparity

in the pre-marital assets of the

~arties

is accounted for by

the three substantial errors of the lower court in making the
distribution of the property.

It is hard to imagine the ration

employed by the lower court in preferentially treating the
Independence property over the other properties owned by the
parties.

Yet, the court by ;l ts calculations, gave the respon-

dent over a $30,000.00 windfall.
-16-

Second, the trial court
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did not make an attem.pt to debit the respondent's pre-marital
assets by the amount o;f his pre-marital debt.

As outlined in the

argument, there was very little that the respondent brought into
the marriage that was not encumbered.

Lastly, the debiting of the

appellant's pre-martial assets by the alleged gift in the amount
of $10,000.00 is totally contrary to the evidence.
person testifying

substant~vely

on the issue was the

The only
appell~nt

who testified that the money was paid to sever the joint ownership of the Wood Shed business.

Any other construction of the

evidence simply has no support in the record.

It is respectfully

submitted that this court must correct the three tragic errors
committed by the trial court which led to such a devastating and
inequitable result for the appellant.
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of April, 1980.

RICHARD B. J
SON, for:
HOWARD, LEWI & PETERSEN
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant
NAILED a copy of the foregoing Brief to Mr. George E. Mangan,
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent, P.O. Box 246, Roosevelt, Utah
84066; dated th!s 21st day of April, 1980.
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